NDLI: U.S. interest groups prefer emission trading: A new perspective

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Tinggaard Svendsen, Gert
Copyright Year	1999
Abstract	If there is to be environmental regulation, what kind of regulation would the main interest groups then prefer? This political distortion must be taken into account when designing future environmental regulation such as CO$_{2}$ regulation. The three main interest groups in the U.S. (private business, environmentalist groups and the electricity sector) prefer a grandfathered permit market. Business is attracted by this solution because free initial distribution of permits both favours existing sources financially and, furthermore, creates a barrier to entry for new firms. Environmentalist groups have changed attitudes and promote the idea too as a way of negotiating higher target reduction levels with industry to maintain voluntary contributions from their members. Finally, electric utilities prefer a grandfathered permit market, and this step towards less planned economy may be explained by the rise of competition in the U.S. electricity sector. Therefore, it is suggested that a grandfathered permit market is a more effective policy than a tax in relation to organized interests such as industry, electric utilities and environmental organizations. In perspective, the grandfathered permit market may be mixed with the use of taxes. In the case of CO$_{2}$ regulation, for example, taxes may be applied to badly organized polluters, such as households and the transport sector, because their lobbying power is weak.
Starting Page	109
Ending Page	128
Page Count	20
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00485829
Journal	Public Choice
Volume Number	101
Issue Number	1-2
e-ISSN	15737101
Language	English
Publisher	Kluwer Academic Publishers
Publisher Date	1999-01-01
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Public Finance & Economics Political Science
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Sociology and Political Science Economics and Econometrics

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