NDLI: One-dimensionality and stability in legislative voting

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Schwartz, Thomas
Copyright Year	2010
Abstract	The widespread use in legislative studies of the one-dimensional model and its median-stability consequence raises a question: Do stability and one-dimensionality rest on evidence drawn from observed votes? They do not and cannot. I prove that every possible legislative history is compatible with a transitive majority preference (hence stability), and except in very special circumstances with a cyclic majority preference (hence instability) as well: observed votes can never refute and almost never confirm stability. One-dimensionality fares worse: any legislative history is compatible with the one-dimensional model if it includes no two votes with overlapping pairs of alternatives, but otherwise, I show, it is almost certainly incompatible with the model, even in those rare cases that ensure transitivity. Voting evidence aside, the one-dimensional model is unduly restrictive, and arguments in its defense do not survive scrutiny.
Starting Page	197
Ending Page	214
Page Count	18
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00485829
Journal	Public Choice
Volume Number	148
Issue Number	1-2
e-ISSN	15737101
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2010-07-10
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Dimensionality Single-peakedness Legislatures Voting Political Science Public Finance & Economics
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Sociology and Political Science Economics and Econometrics

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