NDLI: Electoral politics and monetary policy: does the Bank of Canada contribute to a political business cycle?

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Ferris, J. Stephen
Copyright Year	2008
Abstract	In this paper I apply the work of Abrams and Iossifov (Public Choice 129:249–262, 2006) to monetary policy in Canada to see if same political party affiliation is needed to produce evidence of political opportunism. After modifying their analysis to maintain the time-series consistency of their variables for Canada, I find that both an error correction model and a Taylor rule reformulation of their test generate evidence consistent with same party political opportunism, but only weakly so. On the other hand, I also find the presence of more traditional indicators of political influence. In particular, the data suggest that the election of a Liberal party government, a decrease in the degree of political competition, and to a lesser extent, the election of a minority government all positively influence the expansiveness of Canadian monetary policy.
Starting Page	449
Ending Page	468
Page Count	20
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00485829
Journal	Public Choice
Volume Number	135
Issue Number	3-4
e-ISSN	15737101
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2008-01-08
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Central Bank Independence Monetary political cycles Same party affiliation Taylor Rule Error correction model Political competition Political Science Public Finance & Economics
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Sociology and Political Science Economics and Econometrics

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