NDLI: Anti-exceptionalism about logic

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Hjortland, Ole Thomassen
Copyright Year	2016
Abstract	Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy (Proc Address Am Philos Assoc 76:61–90, 2002), Priest (Doubt truth to be a liar, OUP, Oxford, 2006a, The metaphysics of logic, CUP, Cambridge, 2014, Log et Anal, 2016), Russell (Philos Stud 171:161–175, 2014, J Philos Log 0:1–11, 2015), and Williamson (Modal logic as metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013b, The relevance of the liar, OUP, Oxford, 2015). Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, they disagree about which logic anti-exceptionalism supports. Williamson uses an anti-exceptionalist argument to defend classical logic, while Priest claims that his anti-exceptionalism supports nonclassical logic. This paper argues that the disagreement is due to a difference in how the parties understand logical theories. Once we reject Williamson’s deflationary account of logical theories, the argument for classical logic is undercut. Instead an alternative account of logical theories is offered, on which logical pluralism is a plausible supplement to anti-exceptionalism.
Starting Page	631
Ending Page	658
Page Count	28
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00318116
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume Number	174
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	15730883
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2016-06-09
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Anti-exceptionalism Abduction Philosophy of logic Nonclassical logics Logical pluralism Philosophy Epistemology Philosophy of Mind Ethics Metaphysics Philosophy of Language
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy

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