NDLI: The real epistemic problem of cognitive penetration

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Ghijsen, Harmen
Copyright Year	2015
Abstract	The phenomenon of cognitive penetration has received a lot of attention in recent epistemology, as it seems to make perceptual justification too easy to come by for experientialist theories of justification. Some have tried to respond to this challenge by arguing that cognitive penetration downgrades the epistemic status of perceptual experience, thereby diminishing its justificatory power. I discuss two examples of this strategy, and argue that they fail on several grounds. Most importantly, they fail to realize that cognitive penetration is just an instance of a larger problem for experientialist theories of perceptual justification. The challenge does not lie in explaining how cognitive penetration is able to downgrade the epistemic status of perceptual experience, the challenge lies in explaining why perceptual experience would have a special epistemic status to begin with. To answer this challenge, experientialists have to solve the distinctiveness problem: they have to explain what is so distinctive about perceptual experience that enables it to provide evidential justification without being in need of justification itself. Unfortunately, an internalist answer to this problem does not appear to be forthcoming, even though it would certainly help with explaining the problem of cognitive penetration.
Starting Page	1457
Ending Page	1475
Page Count	19
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00318116
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume Number	173
Issue Number	6
e-ISSN	15730883
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2015-09-05
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Cognitive penetration Experientialism Dogmatism Distinctiveness problem Epistemic downgrade Philosophy Epistemology Philosophy of Mind Ethics Metaphysics Philosophy of Language
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
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