NDLI: How to be impartial as a subjectivist

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Atiq, Emad H.
Copyright Year	2015
Abstract	The metaethical subjectivist claims that there is nothing more to a moral disagreement than a conflict in the desires of the parties involved. Recently, David Enoch has argued that metaethical subjectivism has unacceptable ethical implications. If the subjectivist is right about moral disagreement, then it follows, according to Enoch, that we cannot stand our ground in moral disagreements without violating the demands of impartiality. For being impartial, we’re told, involves being willing to compromise in conflicts that are merely due to competing desires—the parties to such conflicts should decide what to do on the basis of a coin flip. I suggest that Enoch is mistaken in his conception of what it means to be impartial. Once impartiality is properly construed, standing one’s ground in desire-based conflicts, whether or not moral values are at stake in the conflict, is consistent with being impartial. I defend a view on which impartiality can be understood in terms of features of our desiring attitudes. An agent acts impartially in desire-based conflicts whenever she is motivated by a final (i.e. non-instrumental) desire that aims at promoting the wellbeing of persons in a way that is insensitive to the identities of persons and their morally arbitrary features like their gender or skin color. Based on the account, I explain where Enoch’s discussion of the argument goes wrong, as well as why responses to the argument from Enoch’s critics have so far missed the mark.
Starting Page	757
Ending Page	779
Page Count	23
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00318116
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume Number	173
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	15730883
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2015-07-15
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Subjectivism Robust realism Impartiality Moral disagreement Philosophy Epistemology Philosophy of Mind Ethics Metaphysics Philosophy of Language
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, and how to cope with it

The promise and perils of hybrid moral semantics for naturalistic moral realism

The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism

Darwin and moral realism: survival of the iffiest

Matters of ambiguity: faultless disagreement, relativism and realism

Moral judgment as a natural kind

No deep disagreement for new relativists

A limited defense of moral perception

Moral relativism is moral realism

How to be impartial as a subjectivist

Similar Documents

The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, and how to cope with it

The promise and perils of hybrid moral semantics for naturalistic moral realism

The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism

Darwin and moral realism: survival of the iffiest

Matters of ambiguity: faultless disagreement, relativism and realism

Moral judgment as a natural kind

No deep disagreement for new relativists

A limited defense of moral perception

Moral relativism is moral realism

How to be impartial as a subjectivist