NDLI: Thinking things and feeling things: on an alleged discontinuity in folk metaphysics of mind

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Phelan, Mark Arico, Adam Nichols, Shaun
Copyright Year	2012
Abstract	According to the discontinuity view, people recognize a deep discontinuity between phenomenal and intentional states, such that they refrain from attributing feelings and experiences to entities that do not have the right kind of body, though they may attribute thoughts to entities that lack a biological body, like corporations, robots, and disembodied souls. We examine some of the research that has been used to motivate the discontinuity view. Specifically, we focus on experiments that examine people's aptness judgments for various mental state ascriptions to groups. These studies seem to reveal that people are more inclined to think of groups as having intentionality than as having phenomenology. Combined with the fact that groups obviously lack a single biological body, this has been taken as evidence that people operate according to the relevant discontinuity. However, these studies support discontinuity only on the assumption that the experimental participants are interpreting the relevant group mental state ascriptions in a specific way. We present evidence that people are not interpreting these ascriptions in a way that supports discontinuity. Instead, we argue that people generally interpret group mental state ascriptions distributively, as attributions of mental states to various group members.
Starting Page	703
Ending Page	725
Page Count	23
File Format	PDF
ISSN	15687759
Journal	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Volume Number	12
Issue Number	4
e-ISSN	15728676
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2012-09-15
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Phenomenal consciousness Collective intentionality Linguistic pragmatics Methodology Experimental philosophy Philosophy of sociology Group minds Phenomenology Interdisciplinary Studies Philosophy of Mind Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics)
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy Cognitive Neuroscience

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