NDLI: Shareholders Should Welcome Knowledge Workers as Directors

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Osterloh, Margit Frey, Bru S.
Copyright Year	2006
Abstract	The most influential approach of corporate governance, the view of shareholders’ supremacy does not take into consideration that the key task of modern corporations is to generate and transfer firm-specific knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the widespread corporate scandals, the interests of top management and directors should be increasingly aligned to shareholder’ interests by making the board more responsible to shareholders, and monitoring of top management by independent outside directors should be strengthened. Corporate governance reform needs to go in another direction altogether. Firm-specific knowledge investments are, like financial investments, not ex ante contractible, leaving investors open to exploitation by shareholders. Employees therefore refuse to make firm-specific investments. To gain a sustainable competitive advantage, there must be an incentive to undertake such firm-specific investments. Three proposals are advanced to deal with this dilemma: (1) The board should rely more on insiders. (2) The insiders should be elected by those employees of the firm who are making firm-specific knowledge investments. (3) The board should be chaired by a neutral person. These proposals have major advantages: they provide incentives for knowledge investors; they countervail the dominance of executives; they encourage intrinsic work motivation and loyalty to the firm by strengthening distributive and procedural justice, and they ensure diversity on the board while lowering transaction costs. These proposals for reforming the board may help to overcome the crisis corporate governance is in. At the same time, they provide a step in the direction of a more adequate theory of the firm as a basis for corporate governance.
Starting Page	325
Ending Page	345
Page Count	21
File Format	PDF
ISSN	13853457
Journal	Journal of Management and Governance
Volume Number	10
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	1572963X
Language	English
Publisher	Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers
Publisher Date	2006-09-13
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	corporate governance shareholders board directors insiders firm-specific knowledge Sociology Industrial Organization Accounting/Auditing Management
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Business and International Management

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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