NDLI: On Sterba’s Argument from Rationality to Morality

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Darwall, Stephen
Copyright Year	2014
Abstract	James Sterba argues for morality as a principled compromise between self-regarding and other-regarding reasons (Morality as Compromise) and that either egoists or altruists, who always give overriding weight to self-regarding and other-reasons, respectively, can be shown to beg the question against morality. He concludes that moral conduct is “rationally required.” Sterba’s dialectic assumes that both egoists and altruists accept that both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations are genuine pro tanto reasons, but then hold that their respective reasons always outweigh. Against this, I argue that egoists would most plausibly deny that non-self-regarding considerations have even pro tanto weight. I argue, also, that even if both sides grant the pro tanto weight of their opponent’s reasons, Sterba is mistaken in holding that only Morality as Compromise provides a “non-question-begging resolution” of what it is rational to do when self-regarding and other-regarding reasons conflict, since it might be that it is rational to act on either. It might be that the weightiest self-regarding and the weightiest other-regarding reasons in the case are both sufficient reasons for acting without either being conclusive. The essay ends with a sketch of arguments against egoism that I take to be more plausible than Sterba’s. As I have argued elsewhere, what makes an agent’s own welfare or her own concerns or interests normative for her simultaneously makes them normative for others as well.
Starting Page	243
Ending Page	252
Page Count	10
File Format	PDF
ISSN	13824554
Journal	The Journal of Ethics
Volume Number	18
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	15728609
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2014-07-15
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Altruism Egoism Morality Reasons Respect Welfare Ethics Political Philosophy Philosophy
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy

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