NDLI: Asymmetric Payoffs and Spatial Competition

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Zennyo, Yusuke
Copyright Year	2016
Abstract	We investigate the location choice of two firms whose objectives are the weighted average of their own profit and social welfare, in which they simultaneously decide their locations before setting their prices. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the asymmetric locations are influenced by the asymmetry of the firms’ objectives or by the asymmetry of firms’ marginal costs. We show that, when both firms have the same marginal cost, the equilibrium locations are always symmetric even in the case of the asymmetric objectives. On the other hand, the cost differences lead the asymmetric locations in equilibrium. That is, the asymmetric locations are a result of the cost asymmetry, but not the asymmetry of the firms’ objectives. We also demonstrate that the pursuit of profit by the cost-inefficient firm may increase consumer surplus.
Starting Page	29
Ending Page	41
Page Count	13
File Format	PDF
ISSN	15661679
Journal	Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
Volume Number	17
Issue Number	1
e-ISSN	15737012
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2016-07-18
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Asymmetric payoff Location choice Mixed duopoly Corporate social responsibility Industrial Organization Economic Policy R & D/Technology Policy European Integration Microeconomics International Economics
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics and Econometrics Industrial Relations

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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