NDLI: A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Dechenaux, Emmanuel Koveck, Dan Sheremeta, Roman M.
Copyright Year	2014
Abstract	Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly effort while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a comprehensive review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, risk and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we review studies examining sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, group contests and gender, as well as field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests and suggest directions for future research.
Starting Page	609
Ending Page	669
Page Count	61
File Format	PDF
ISSN	13864157
Journal	Experimental Economics
Volume Number	18
Issue Number	4
e-ISSN	15736938
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2014-11-06
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Contests All-pay auctions Tournaments Experiments Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Behavioral/Experimental Economics Microeconomics Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Operation Research/Decision Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics, Econometrics and Finance

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