NDLI: Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Danz, David N. Fehr, Dietmar Kübler, Dorothea
Copyright Year	2012
Abstract	We study beliefs and actions in a repeated normal-form game. Using a level-k model of limited strategic reasoning and allowing for other-regarding preferences, we classify action and belief choices with regard to their strategic sophistication and study their development over time. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure, feedback about actions in the previous period and random matching, we run treatments (i) with fixed matching, (ii) without information about the other player’s payoffs, and (iii) without feedback about previous play. In all treatments with feedback, we observe more strategic play (increasing by 15 percent) and higher-level beliefs (increasing by 18 percent) over time. Without feedback, neither beliefs nor actions reach significantly higher levels of reasoning (with increases of 2 percentage points for actions and 6 percentage points for beliefs). The levels of reasoning reflected in actions and beliefs are highly consistent, but less so for types with lower levels of reasoning.
Starting Page	622
Ending Page	640
Page Count	19
File Format	PDF
ISSN	13864157
Journal	Experimental Economics
Volume Number	15
Issue Number	4
e-ISSN	15736938
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2012-03-10
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Beliefs Level-k model Learning Public Finance & Economics Microeconomics Economic Theory Methodology and the History of Economic Thought Operations Research/Decision Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics, Econometrics and Finance

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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