NDLI: Preference submission timing in school choice matching: testing fairness and efficiency in the laboratory

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Lien, Jaimie W. Zheng, Jie Zhong, Xiaohan
Copyright Year	2015
Abstract	We investigate the relative merits of the Boston and Serial Dictatorship mechanisms when the timing of students’ preference submission over schools varies within the structure of the mechanism. Despite the well-documented disadvantages of the Boston mechanism Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (American Economic Review 93:729–747 2003), we hypothesize that a Boston mechanism where students are required to submit their preferences before the realization of their exam scores, can in fact have fairness and efficiency advantages compared to the often favored Serial Dictatorship mechanism. We test these hypotheses in a series of laboratory experiments which vary by the class of mechanism implemented, and the preference submission timing by students, reflective of actual policy changes which have occurred in China. Our experimental findings confirm the efficiency hypothesis straightforwardly, and lend support to the fairness hypothesis when subjects have the chance to learn with experience. The results have important policy implications for school choice mechanism design when students’ relative rankings by schools are initially uncertain.
Starting Page	116
Ending Page	150
Page Count	35
File Format	PDF
ISSN	13864157
Journal	Experimental Economics
Volume Number	19
Issue Number	1
e-ISSN	15736938
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2015-03-03
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	School choice matching Uncertainty Experiments College admission Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Behavioral/Experimental Economics Microeconomics Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Operation Research/Decision Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics, Econometrics and Finance

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