NDLI: Comparison of criminal and administrative penalties for environmental offenses

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Blondiau, Thomas Billiet, Carole M. Rousseau, Sandra
Copyright Year	2014
Abstract	We conduct a counterfactual analysis to measure the treatment difference between administrative and criminal enforcement of environmental violations. Our aim is to control for the selection bias effect and make a comparison of how similar offenses are treated in both enforcement tracks. This analysis is relevant to answer the question of how deterrence and welfare in a combined criminal-administrative enforcement system compare with an enforcement system relying on criminal penalization only. This is an important question given the observed shift towards two-track penalization systems, combining administrative and criminal penalization, for environmental enforcement in the European Union. We apply matching techniques on a unique dataset of environmental enforcement cases to control for sample selection bias. We match different enforcement cases, based on case characteristics and estimate the average treatment effect for these cases. Overall, we find that the marginal penalty is slightly lower in administrative enforcement compared to criminal enforcement.
Starting Page	11
Ending Page	35
Page Count	25
File Format	PDF
ISSN	09291261
Journal	European Journal of Law and Economics
Volume Number	39
Issue Number	1
e-ISSN	15729990
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2014-11-21
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Environmental law enforcement Criminal and administrative enforcement Propensity score matching Counterfactual analysis Law and Economics European Integration Public Finance & Economics Commercial Law
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Business and International Management Law Economics and Econometrics

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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