NDLI: Is limiting financial supervisory liability a way to prevent defensive conduct? The outcome of a European survey

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Dijkstra, Robert J.
Copyright Year	2015
Abstract	One of the arguments frequently used to limit the liability of financial supervisory authorities is the idea that normal liability rules result in defensive conduct and, therefore, in ineffective financial supervision. The impact of tort law on financial supervisory authorities is, however, highly debated, and no overwhelming empirical evidence exists to support it. This article presents findings from an empirical study on financial supervisors in the member states of the European Union. Targeting senior financial supervisors, the survey presented a series of statements, asking respondents to state their opinions about the impact of financial supervisory liability. In summary, most of the respondents seem to classify the impact of financial supervisory liability as neutral or positive. At most, the evidence from the survey implies an arguably modest degree of deterrence. Because the survey found no significant differences between respondents who perceive the liability of their organization as limited and those who do not, it suggests that limiting financial supervisory liability does not have an impact on the behavior, or at least on the perceptions of the impact of financial supervisory liability, of financial supervisors. Therefore, the study calls into question the widely accepted argument of defensive conduct as a reason for limiting the liability of financial supervisory authorities.
Starting Page	59
Ending Page	81
Page Count	23
File Format	PDF
ISSN	09291261
Journal	European Journal of Law and Economics
Volume Number	43
Issue Number	1
e-ISSN	15729990
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2015-01-22
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Financial supervisory liability Tort law Deterrence Empirical research Defensive conduct Law and Economics European Integration Public Finance Commercial Law
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Business and International Management Law Economics and Econometrics

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
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