NDLI: Payments or Persuasion: Common Pool Resource Management with Price and Non-price Measures

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Delaney, Jason Jacobson, Sarah
Copyright Year	2015
Abstract	We use lab experiments to study policies that address common pool resource overuse. We look at a price mechanism, specifically a Pigouvian subsidy, and four non-price interventions. The non-price policies are information alone, information with a normative message, communication alone, and normative messages with communication allowed. In all experiment sessions, no intervention occurs in the first seven and last seven rounds, allowing us to examine the effects of introducing and taking away a policy. The subsidy leads to near-efficient extraction, but surprisingly leads groups that were not over-extracting to also reduce extraction. This over-compliance decreases efficiency, although on net the subsidy is the most efficiency-enhancing intervention. Information provision, communication, normative appeals, and normative appeals combined with communication all reduce over-extraction (though by less than the subsidy) without exacerbating over-compliance; however, the effects of information alone and communication alone are small and not robust. The non-price policies cause a decline in over-extraction of from 0.549 (information) to 11.441 % (normative appeals with communication). These effects are of the same order of magnitude as the effects seen in major field studies of conservation messaging. The subsidy has the worst persistence properties (after the intervention ceases), while normative messages with communication have the best.
Starting Page	747
Ending Page	772
Page Count	26
File Format	PDF
ISSN	09246460
Journal	Environmental and Resource Economics
Volume Number	65
Issue Number	4
e-ISSN	15731502
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2015-05-16
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Common pool resource Communication Information Pigouvian subsidy Social norms Voluntary cooperation Laboratory experiment Environmental Economics Environmental Law/Policy/Ecojustice Economic Policy Economics Environmental Management
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics and Econometrics Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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