NDLI: Technology Diffusion with Market Power in the Upstream Industry

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Peri, Grischa
Copyright Year	2010
Abstract	This paper compares taxes and tradable permits when used to regulate a competitive and polluting downstream industry that can purchase an abatement technology from a monopolistic upstream industry. Second-best policies are derived for the full range of the abatement technology’s emission intensities and marginal abatement costs. The second-best permit quantity can be both above or below the socially optimal emission level. Explicit consideration of the output market provides further insights on how market power distorts the allocation in the downstream industry. The ranking between permits and taxes is ambiguous in general, but taxes weakly dominate permits if full diffusion is socially optimal. In addition, it is analysed how a cap on the permit price affects the diffusion of an abatement technology.
Starting Page	403
Ending Page	428
Page Count	26
File Format	PDF
ISSN	09246460
Journal	Environmental and Resource Economics
Volume Number	46
Issue Number	4
e-ISSN	15731502
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2010-03-27
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Diffusion Market power Price bounds Taxes Tradable permits Environmental Management Economics/Management Science Economic Policy Environmental Law/Policy/Ecojustice Environmental Economics
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics and Econometrics Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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