NDLI: Implications of a Reserve Price in an Agent-Based Common-Value Auction

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Boyer, Christopher N. Brorsen, B. Wade
Copyright Year	2013
Abstract	Auction sellers can use a reserve price to require a minimum bid before items are sold. Theoretical and experimental research has tested the influence of a reserve price in an independent private values auction, but little focus has been given to the influence of a reserve price in a first-price common-value auction. We establish an agent-based first-price common-value auction to determine the impact of the reserve price with two buyers and with three buyers. An agent-based approach to this problem is both a unique contribution to the literature and appropriate since finding analytical solutions with common-value auctions is difficult. The agent-based model approach also allows us to consider buyers that have non-symmetric bid functions. Furthermore, we introduce a combination of numerical integration techniques with a new particle swarm learning algorithm. The buyers in the model choose their expected-net-revenue-maximizing bid price, and sellers choose their expected-revenue-maximizing reserve price. In the two-buyer and three-buyer auction, a reserve price increases the equilibrium winning bid price, decreases the probability that the item is sold, and increases the seller’s expected revenue. A reserve price in a two-buyer auction increases the winning bid price more than including an additional buyer in the auction with no reserve price. However, due to only receiving a salvage value when the item does not sell in the auction, the seller’s expected revenue is higher in the three-buyer first-price common-value auction without a reserve price than in the two-buyer auction with a reserve price.
Starting Page	33
Ending Page	51
Page Count	19
File Format	PDF
ISSN	09277099
Journal	Computational Economics
Volume Number	43
Issue Number	1
e-ISSN	15729974
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2013-12-05
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Agent-based model Common-value auction First-price auction Reserve price Economic Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics, Econometrics and Finance Computer Science Applications

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
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9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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