NDLI: Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics and Their Selection Mechanisms

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Gao, Xing Zhong, Weijun Mei, Shue
Copyright Year	2012
Abstract	An underlying assumption of deterministic evolutionary game dynamics is that all individuals interact with each other in infinite populations, which seems unrealistic since in reality populations are always finite in size and even disturbed by stochastic effects and random drift. Developed in the context of finite populations and described by finite state Markov processes, stochastic evolutionary game dynamics have received much attention recently. However, the relationship between two types of evolutionary dynamics so far has failed to be thoroughly understood. In this paper, we establish several classes of selection mechanisms in large populations under which corresponding stochastic evolutionary dynamics approach the imitative dynamic (including the replicator dynamic), the impartial pairwise comparison dynamic (including the Smith dynamic) and the separable excess payoff dynamic (including the Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamic) respectively in adjusted forms. In other words, we present intuitive interpretations from a statistical perspective for these deterministic dynamics by constructing their microscopic foundations in settings with finite but large populations.
Starting Page	233
Ending Page	247
Page Count	15
File Format	PDF
ISSN	09277099
Journal	Computational Economics
Volume Number	41
Issue Number	2
e-ISSN	15729974
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2012-03-15
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics Finite population Selection mechanisms Coordination game Economic Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics, Econometrics and Finance Computer Science Applications

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
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3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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