NDLI: Compliance signaling games: toward modeling the deterrence of insider threats

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Casey, William Morales, Jose Andre Wright, Evan Zhu, Quanyan Mishra, Bud
Copyright Year	2016
Abstract	In a typical workplace, organizational policies and their compliance requirements set the stage upon which the behavioral patterns of individual agents evolve. The agents’ personal utilities, access to information, and strategic deceptions shape the signaling systems of an intricate information-asymmetric game, thus mystifying assessment and management of organizational risks, which are primarily due to unintentional insider threats. Compliance games, as discussed here, model a rudimentary version of this signaling game between a sender (employee) and a receiver (organization). The analysis of these games’ equilibria as well as their dynamics in repeated game settings illuminate the effectiveness or risks of an organizational policy. These questions are explored via a repeated and agent-based simulation of compliance signaling games, leading to the following: (1) a simple but broadly applicable model for interactions between sender agents (employees) and receiver agents (principals in the organization), (2) an investigation of how the game theoretic approach yields the plausible dynamics of compliance, and (3) design of experiments to estimate parameters of the systems: evolutionary learning rates of agents, the efficacy of auditing using a trembling hand strategy, effects of non-stationary and multiple principal agents, and ultimately, the robustness of the system under perturbation of various related parameters (costs, penalties, benefits, etc.). The paper concludes with a number of empirical studies, illustrating a battery of compliance games under varying environments designed to investigate agent based learning, system control, and optimization. The studies indicate how agents through limited interactions described by behavior traces may learn and optimize responses to a stationary defense, expose sensitive parameters and emergent properties and indicate the possibility of controlling interventions which actuate game parameters. We believe that the work is of practical importance—for example, in constraining the vulnerability surfaces arising from compliance games.
Starting Page	318
Ending Page	349
Page Count	32
File Format	PDF
ISSN	1381298X
Journal	Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory
Volume Number	22
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	15729346
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2016-04-28
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Compliance Signaling game Evolutionary games Agent based models Management Operation Research/Decision Theory Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics) Sociology Methodology of the Social Sciences
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Applied Mathematics Computer Science Decision Sciences Computational Mathematics Modeling and Simulation

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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