NDLI: “In One”: The Bearer Issue and the Principles of Exemplification

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“In One”: The Bearer Issue and the Principles of Exemplification

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Cumpa, Javier
Copyright Year	2012
Abstract	Traditionally, the so-called exemplification or the relation between the particular and the universal has been one of the three central problems making up the classical problem of universals: (1) What is a particular? (2) What is a universal? (3) What is the relation between the particular and the universal? I used the expression “classical problem of universals” instead of “the problem of universals” since the classical formulation of the problem could be said to contain a questionable assumption, namely that substance should be the bearer “in” which are the entities of (other) categories. Under these circumstances, a neutral approach to the problem of universals could consist in reformulating the three problems of the classical problem as follows: (4) What is the fundamental bearer of categories? (5) What categories are there? (6) What is the relation between the fundamental bearer and the categories? My purpose in this paper is to answer the latter three questions. In order to accomplish this task, I shall discuss the views of two leading figures in substance-ontology, Aristotle and Jonathan Lowe, and the views of two leading figures in fact-ontology, Gustav Bergmann and Reinhardt Grossmann. I shall answer the first question by claiming that the fundamental bearer of categories is facts; the second, by pointing out that it depends on the answer to the previous one; and the third, by showing that the relation between the fundamental bearer and the categories is the one between facts and its constituents, not between a substance or particular and its accidents or properties. In this connection, I shall argue that the “in” of property exemplification should be categorially reconstructed in order for entities other than properties, say, particulars, relations, connectives, numbers, and even facts, to be “in” facts. This categorial reconstruction will also argued for with respect to the Principle of Exemplification.
Starting Page	201
Ending Page	211
Page Count	11
File Format	PDF
ISSN	11221151
Journal	Axiomathes
Volume Number	23
Issue Number	2
e-ISSN	15728390
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
Publisher Date	2012-05-13
Publisher Place	Dordrecht
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Subject Keyword	Philosophy Ontology Linguistics (general) Cognitive Psychology Logic
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy Mathematics

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“In One”: The Bearer Issue and the Principles of Exemplification