NDLI: Autonomous coalitions

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Gonzalez, Stéphane Grabisch, Michel
Copyright Year	2015
Abstract	We consider in this paper solutions for TU-games where it is not assumed that the grand coalition is necessarily the final state of cooperation. Partitions of the grand coalition, or balanced collections together with a system of balancing weights interpreted as a time allocation vector are considered as possible states of cooperation. The former case corresponds to the c-core, while the latter corresponds to the aspiration core or d-core, where in both case, the best configuration (called a maximising collection) is sought. We study maximising collections and characterize them with autonomous coalitions, that is, coalitions for which any solution of the d-core yields a payment for that coalition equal to its worth. In particular we show that the collection of autonomous coalitions is balanced, and that one cannot have at the same time a single possible payment (core element) and a single possible configuration. We also introduce the notion of inescapable coalitions, that is, those present in every maximising collection. We characterize the class of games for which the sets of autonomous coalitions, vital coalitions (in the sense of Shellshear and Sudhölter), and inescapable coalitions coincide, and prove that the set of games having a unique maximising coalition is dense in the set of games.
Starting Page	301
Ending Page	317
Page Count	17
File Format	PDF
ISSN	02545330
Journal	Annals of Operations Research
Volume Number	235
Issue Number	1
e-ISSN	15729338
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2015-09-01
Publisher Place	New York
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Cooperative game Core Balancedness C-core Aspiration core Coalition formation Operation Research/Decision Theory Combinatorics Theory of Computation
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Management Science and Operations Research

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