NDLI: Simple negotiation schemes for agents with simple preferences: sufficiency, necessity and maximality

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Chevaleyre, Yann Endriss, Ulle Maudet, Nicolas
Copyright Year	2009
Abstract	We investigate the properties of an abstract negotiation framework where agents autonomously negotiate over allocations of indivisible resources. In this framework, reaching an allocation that is optimal may require very complex multilateral deals. Therefore, we are interested in identifying classes of valuation functions such that any negotiation conducted by means of deals involving only a single resource at a time is bound to converge to an optimal allocation whenever all agents model their preferences using these functions. In the case of negotiation with monetary side payments amongst self-interested but myopic agents, the class of modular valuation functions turns out to be such a class. That is, modularity is a sufficient condition for convergence in this framework. We also show that modularity is not a necessary condition. Indeed, there can be no condition on individual valuation functions that would be both necessary and sufficient in this sense. Evaluating conditions formulated with respect to the whole profile of valuation functions used by the agents in the system would be possible in theory, but turns out to be computationally intractable in practice. Our main result shows that the class of modular functions is maximal in the sense that no strictly larger class of valuation functions would still guarantee an optimal outcome of negotiation, even when we permit more general bilateral deals. We also establish similar results in the context of negotiation without side payments.
Starting Page	234
Ending Page	259
Page Count	26
File Format	PDF
ISSN	13872532
Journal	Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Volume Number	20
Issue Number	2
e-ISSN	15737454
Language	English
Publisher	Springer US
Publisher Date	2009-04-25
Publisher Place	Boston
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Multiagent resource allocation Negotiation User Interfaces and Human Computer Interaction Software Engineering/Programming and Operating Systems Computing Methodologies Computer Systems Organization and Communication Networks Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics)
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Artificial Intelligence

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