NDLI: Tacit collusion games in pool-based electricity markets under transmission constraints

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Hobbs, Benjamin F. Liu, Andrew L.
Copyright Year	2013
Abstract	Harrington et al. (Math Program Ser B 104:407–435, 2005) introduced a general framework for modeling tacit collusion in which producing firms collectively maximize the Nash bargaining objective function, subject to incentive compatibility constraints. This work extends that collusion model to the setting of a competitive pool-based electricity market operated by an independent system operator. The extension has two features. First, the locationally distinct markets in which firms compete are connected by transmission lines. Capacity limits of the transmission lines, together with the laws of physics that guide the flow of electricity, may alter firms’ strategic behavior. Second, in addition to electricity power producers, other market participants, including system operators and power marketers, play important roles in a competitive electricity market. The new players are included in the model in order to better represent real-world markets, and this inclusion will impact power producers’ strategic behavior as well. The resulting model is a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Properties of the specific MPEC are discussed and numerical examples illustrating the impacts of transmission congestion in a collusive game are presented.
Ending Page	379
Page Count	29
Starting Page	351
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00255610
e-ISSN	14364646
Journal	Mathematical Programming
Issue Number	2
Volume Number	140
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publisher Date	2013-06-25
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Collusion Applications of mathematical programming MPEC Theoretical, Mathematical and Computational Physics Electricity market Transmission Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) Mathematical Methods in Physics Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control; Optimization Mathematics of Computing Numerical Analysis Nonconvex programming, global optimization Nonlinear programming Combinatorics
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Mathematics Software

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