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Modeling tax evasion with genetic algorithms

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Warner, Geoffrey Wijesinghe, Sanith Marques, Uma Badar, Osama Rosen, Jacob Hemberg, Erik O’Reilly, Una May
Copyright Year	2014
Abstract	The U.S. tax gap is estimated to exceed $450 billion, most of which arises from non-compliance on the part of individual taxpayers (GAO 2012; IRS 2006). Much is hidden in innovative tax shelters combining multiple business structures such as partnerships, trusts, and S-corporations into complex transaction networks designed to reduce and obscure the true tax liabilities of their individual shareholders. One known gambit employed by these shelters is to offset real gains in one part of a portfolio by creating artificial capital losses elsewhere through the mechanism of “inflated basis” (TaxAnalysts 2005), a process made easier by the relatively flexible set of rules surrounding “pass-through” entities such as partnerships (IRS 2009). The ability to anticipate the likely forms of emerging evasion schemes would help auditors develop more efficient methods of reducing the tax gap. To this end, we have developed a prototype evolutionary algorithm designed to generate potential schemes of the inflated basis type described above. The algorithm takes as inputs a collection of asset types and tax entities, together with a rule-set governing asset exchanges between these entities. The schemes produced by the algorithm consist of sequences of transactions within an ownership network of tax entities. Schemes are ranked according to a “fitness function” (Goldberg in Genetic algorithms in search, optimization, and machine learning. Addison-Wesley, Boston, 1989); the very best schemes are those that afford the highest reduction in tax liability while incurring the lowest expected penalty.
Starting Page	165
Ending Page	178
Page Count	14
File Format	PDF
ISSN	14356104
Journal	Economics of Governance
Volume Number	16
Issue Number	2
e-ISSN	14358131
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publisher Date	2014-11-18
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Tax evasion Genetic algorithms Agent-based modeling Economics general Public Finance & Economics Political Economy Public Administration Economic Theory Political Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Business and International Management Economics, Econometrics and Finance

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
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3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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