NDLI: The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Nandeibam, Shasikanta
Copyright Year	2012
Abstract	This paper replacesGibbard’s (Econometrica 45:665-681, 1977) assumption of strict ordinal preferences by themore natural assumption of cardinal preferences on the set pure social alternatives and we also admit indifferences among the alternatives. By following a similar line of reasoning to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremin the deterministic framework, we first show that if a decision scheme satisfies strategy proofness and unanimity, then there is an underlying probabilistic neutrality result which generates an additive coalitional power function. This result is then used to prove that a decision scheme which satisfies strategy proofness and unanimity can be represented as a weak random dictatorship. A weak random dictatorship assigns each individual a chance to be a weak dictator. An individual has weak dictatorial power if the support of the social choice lottery is always a subset of his/her maximal utility set. In contrast to Gibbard’s complete characterization of randomdictatorship, we also demonstrate with an example that strategy proofness and unanimity are sufficient but not necessary conditions for a weak random dictatorship.
Starting Page	205
Ending Page	238
Page Count	34
File Format	PDF
ISSN	14344742
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume Number	17
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	14344750
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publisher Date	2012-07-21
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Decision scheme Strategy proofness Unanimity Weak dictatorship Weak random dictatorship Economics general Economic Policy
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness

Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity

Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes

Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes

Circular domains

A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts

Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains

An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems

Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade

The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences

Similar Documents

Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness

Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity

Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes

Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes

Circular domains

A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts

Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains

An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems

Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade

The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences