NDLI: Fair and resilient Incentive Tree mechanisms

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Fair and resilient Incentive Tree mechanisms

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Lv, Yuezhou Moscibroda, Thomas
Copyright Year	2015
Abstract	We study Incentive Trees for motivating the participation of people in crowdsourcing or human tasking systems. In an Incentive Tree, each participant is rewarded for contributing to the system, as well as for soliciting new participants into the system, who then themselves contribute to it and/or themselves solicit new participants. An Incentive Tree mechanism is an algorithm that determines how much reward each individual participant receives based on all the participants’ contributions, as well as the structure of the solicitation tree. The sum of rewards paid by the mechanism to all participants is linear in the sum of their total contribution. In this paper, we investigate the possibilities and limitations of Incentive Trees via an axiomatic approach by defining a set of desirable properties that an Incentive Tree mechanism should satisfy. We give a mutual incompatibility result showing that there is no Incentive Tree mechanism that simultaneously achieves all the properties. We then present two novel families of Incentive Tree mechanisms. The first family of mechanisms achieves all desirable properties, except that it fails to protect against a certain strong form of multi-identity attack; the second set of mechanisms achieves all properties, including the strong multi-identity protection, but fails to give participants the opportunity to achieve unbounded reward. Given the above impossibility result, these two mechanisms are effectively the best we can hope for. Finally, our model and results generalize recent studies on multi-level marketing mechanisms.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	16
Page Count	16
File Format	PDF
ISSN	01782770
Journal	Distributed Computing
Volume Number	29
Issue Number	1
e-ISSN	14320452
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publisher Date	2015-09-05
Publisher Place	Berlin/Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Multi-level marketing Crowdsourcing Incentive Trees Reward mechanisms Computer Communication Networks Computer Hardware Computer Systems Organization and Communication Networks Software Engineering/Programming and Operating Systems Theory of Computation
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Theoretical Computer Science Computer Networks and Communications Computational Theory and Mathematics Hardware and Architecture

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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