NDLI: The Chairman’s Paradox Revisited

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Braham, M. Steffen, F.
Copyright Year	2006
Abstract	This paper re-examines the so-called ‘chairman’s paradox‘ that was first noticed by Farquharson in his path breaking tract on sophisticated voting, Theory of Voting (1969). The Chairman’s paradox is concerned with the case of a three member committee in which a particular player who has a regular and a tie-breaking vote – the ‘chairman’ – not only will do worse in specific instances under the plurality procedure for three alternatives than if he did not have such a vote, but will also do worse overall. That is, the chairman’s a priori probability of success (‘getting what one wants’) for all possible games with linear (strict) preference orders is lower than that of the two regular members. It is demonstrated that this result, which comes about if voters act strategically rather than sincerely, is not as robust as it has been thought to be. By merely replacing the standard assumption of linear preference orders with weak preference orders, which allow for indifference, we can escape from the paradox for the canonical case of three players and three alternatives. With weak preference orders, the a priori success of the chairman is now greater than that of the other two players. We also point to a new paradox of sophisticated voting.
Starting Page	231
Ending Page	253
Page Count	23
File Format	PDF
ISSN	01761714
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume Number	28
Issue Number	2
e-ISSN	1432217X
Language	English
Publisher	Springer-Verlag
Publisher Date	2006-06-14
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Economics general Economic Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics

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