NDLI: Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Albizuri, M. Josune Sudhölter, Peter
Copyright Year	2015
Abstract	It is well-known that the core on several domains of cooperative transferable utility (TU) and nontransferable utility (NTU) games is characterized by various combinations of axioms containing some versions of the reduced game property, of its converse, or of the reconfirmation property with respect to the Davis–Maschler reduced game. We show that these characterizations are still valid for games with communication structures à la Myerson when using the notion of the reduced communication structure that establishes a new link between two inside players if they can communicate via outside players. Thus, it is shown that, if communication structures are present, the core may still be characterized on balanced TU games, on totally balanced TU games, on NTU games with a nonempty core, on the domains of all TU or NTU games, and on several other interesting domains of TU and NTU games. As a byproduct we construct, for any NTU game with communication structure, a certain classical NTU game with the same core that may be regarded as its Myerson restricted NTU game.
Starting Page	451
Ending Page	475
Page Count	25
File Format	PDF
ISSN	01761714
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume Number	46
Issue Number	2
e-ISSN	1432217X
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publisher Date	2015-09-29
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Public Finance & Economics Political Economy Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Social Policy
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics

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