NDLI: Evolutionarily stable strategy and invader strategy in matrix games

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Wang, Shuxun Ding, Zhanwen Yang, Honglin
Copyright Year	2012
Abstract	In this paper, we consider the concepts of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), neighborhood invader strategy (NIS) and global invader strategy (GIS) in single species with frequency-dependent interactions. We find some general relationships among the three concepts in matrix games. The main conclusion is that ESS and NIS are equivalent to each other and are both equivalent to local superiority; a strategy with global superiority must be a GIS; a GIS may not be equivalent to its global superiority in games with more than two players; and in any two-player matrix game a GIS is just equivalent to its global superiority. In two-player games, globally asymptotic stability in the replicator dynamics has also been shown. Equivalent conditions for the three concepts stated by payoff comparisons are given and are applied to examples involved.
Ending Page	397
Page Count	15
Starting Page	383
File Format	PDF
ISSN	03036812
e-ISSN	14321416
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Biology
Issue Number	1-2
Volume Number	66
Language	English
Publisher	Springer-Verlag
Publisher Date	2012-02-19
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Invader strategy Replicator dynamics Evolutionarily stable strategy Mathematical and Computational Biology Evolutionary games Global superiority Applications of Mathematics Matrix game Local superiority
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Applied Mathematics Agricultural and Biological Sciences Modeling and Simulation

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