NDLI: Approval voting reconsidered

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Baharad, Eyal Nitzan, Shmuel
Copyright Year	2005
Abstract	The merit of approval voting has been widely discussed in the past 25 years. The distinct property of this rule is the extent of flexibility it allows; any voter can approve as many alternatives/candidates as he wishes. Nevertheless, this advantage is the very reason for two drawbacks of approval voting: its extreme vulnerability to majority decisiveness (Theorem 1) and its extreme vulnerability to erosion of the majority principle (Theorem 2). On the one hand, under some feasible voting strategies any majority of more than 1/2 of the voters can guarantee the selection of its most favorable candidate, regardless of the preferences of the other voters. On the other hand, under alternative voting strategies even the largest majority cannot impose its common most preferred candidate. A simultaneous resolution of the two problems is possible by restricted approval voting (RAV), a voting rule that allows partial voter flexibility by restricting the minimal and maximal number of candidates that can be approved. Our main result (Theorem 3) clarifies how the foregone flexibility in voters’ sovereignty mitigates the above mentioned drawbacks under sincere and insincere coordinated voting. Our findings suggest a new possible justification of a particular voting rule which is based on the significance assigned to three considerations: the advantages of voters’ flexibility, immunity to majority decisiveness and immunity to erosion of the majority principle. Such justification can provide a possible explanation to the prevalent use of some special cases of RAV, notably, of the plurality rule and of approval voting.
Starting Page	619
Ending Page	628
Page Count	10
File Format	PDF
ISSN	09382259
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume Number	26
Issue Number	3
e-ISSN	14320479
Language	English
Publisher	Springer-Verlag
Publisher Date	2005-01-01
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Analysis Economics general Economic Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Economics and Econometrics

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
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3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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