NDLI: Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Akin, Zafer
Copyright Year	2007
Abstract	This paper studies an alternating-offers bargaining game between possibly time-inconsistent players. The time inconsistency is modeled by quasi-hyperbolic discounting and the “naive backwards induction” solution concept is used in order to obtain the results. Both naive agents who remain naive and those who learn about their own preferences are considered. Offers of the players who are naive or partially naive are never accepted by any type of player in either no learning or gradual learning cases. The game between a naive or partially naive player who never learns and a time-consistent agent ends in an immediate agreement if the time-consistent agent is the proposer. A one period delay occurs if the time-consistent agent is the responder. The more naive the player is, the higher the share received. In addition, two naive agents who never learn disagree perpetually. When naive and partially naive agents play against exponential or sophisticated agents and they are able to learn their types over time, there exists a critical date before which there is no agreement. Therefore, the existence of time-inconsistent players who can learn their types as they play the game can be a new explanation for delays in bargaining. The relationship among the degree of naivete, impatience level and bargaining delay is also characterized. Specifically, for sufficiently high discount factors, agreement is always delayed. On the other hand, if the naive agent has sufficiently firm initial beliefs (slow learning or high degree of naivete), agents agree immediately.
Starting Page	275
Ending Page	299
Page Count	25
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00207276
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume Number	36
Issue Number	2
e-ISSN	14321270
Language	English
Publisher	Springer-Verlag
Publisher Date	2007-03-28
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Hyperbolic discounting Learning Bargaining Delay Organization/Planning Operations Research/Decision Theory Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Economic Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Statistics and Probability Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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