NDLI: Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Aricha, Inbar Smorodinsky, Rann
Copyright Year	2012
Abstract	We study an incomplete information mechanism design problem with three peculiarities. First, access to agents’ private information is costly and unobservable. Second, the mechanism may communicate sequentially with the agents. Third, the mechanism designer and all the agents share a common interest. As an example one can think of N geologists that study the potential oil reserves in some tract. The geologists agree on the right course of action, given their N studies. However, carrying out the study may be costly for a geologist and so he may opt to fabricate a study. The oil company that employs these geologists need not contract them simultaneously and may, furthermore, choose to provide some of the results of early studies to geologists employed later on. Finally, the geologists and the oil company would like the joint study to forecast the quantity of oil reserves as accurate as possible. It turns out that, in such settings, what may not be implementable without communication becomes implementable with communication. Clearly, the possibility for sequential communication introduces a lot of complexity to the design problem. However, we provide a result in the spirit of the revelation principle and argue that whenever implementation is possible with communication it is also possible with a simple communication mechanism. Formally, we extend the model and results in Smorodinsky and Tennenholtz (Games Econ Behav 55(2):385–406, 2006) who consider the similar problem but restrict attention to symmetric social choice functions and IID distributions over the private information.
Starting Page	931
Ending Page	946
Page Count	16
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00207276
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume Number	42
Issue Number	4
e-ISSN	14321270
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publisher Date	2012-08-05
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Mechanism design Information elicitation Sequential mechanism Revelation principle Economic Theory Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Operations Research/Decision Theory Game Theory/Mathematical Methods
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Statistics and Probability Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach

False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives

Core deviation minimizing auctions

Stochastic bankruptcy games

Shmuel’s introduction

Picking the winners

My scientific first-born

Bezalel Peleg: a bibliography

Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium

Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms

Similar Documents

Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach

False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives

Core deviation minimizing auctions

Stochastic bankruptcy games

Shmuel’s introduction

Picking the winners

My scientific first-born

Bezalel Peleg: a bibliography

Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium

Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms