NDLI: Imitation dynamics with payoff shocks

Content Provider	Springer Nature Link
Author	Mertikopoulos, Panayotis Viossat, Yannick
Copyright Year	2015
Abstract	We investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of large populations of myopic players that employ simple strategy revision protocols such as the “imitation of success”. In the noiseless case, this process is governed by the standard (deterministic) replicator dynamics; in the presence of noise however, the induced stochastic dynamics are different from previous versions of the stochastic replicator dynamics (such as the aggregate-shocks model of Fudenberg and Harris in J Econ Theory 57(2):420–441, 1992). In this context, we show that strict equilibria are always stochastically asymptotically stable, irrespective of the magnitude of the shocks; on the other hand, in the high-noise regime, non-equilibrium states may also become stochastically asymptotically stable and dominated strategies may survive in perpetuity (they become extinct if the noise is low). Such behavior is eliminated if players are less myopic and revise their strategies based on their cumulative payoffs. In this case, we obtain a second order stochastic dynamical system where non-equilibrium states are no longer attracting and dominated strategies become extinct (a.s.), no matter the noise level.
Starting Page	291
Ending Page	320
Page Count	30
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00207276
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume Number	45
Issue Number	1-2
e-ISSN	14321270
Language	English
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publisher Date	2015-09-29
Publisher Place	Berlin, Heidelberg
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Subject Keyword	Dominated strategies Evolutionary dynamics Replicator dynamics Revision protocols Aggregate payoff shocks Strict equilibria Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Behavioral/Experimental Economics Operation Research/Decision Theory
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Statistics and Probability Social Sciences Economics and Econometrics Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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