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Sequential Mechanisms with Ex-post Participation
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Daskalakis, Constantinos Haghpanah, Nima |
| Copyright Year | 2016 |
| Abstract | We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism satisfies a strong individual rationality constraint, requiring that the stage utility of each agent be positive during each period. We show that the optimum mechanism can be computed by solving a nested sequence of static (single-period) mechanisms that optimize a tradeoff between the surplus of the allocation and the buyer’s utility. We also provide a simple dynamic mechanism that obtains at least half of the optimal revenue. The mechanism either ignores history and posts the optimal monopoly price in each period, or allocates with a probability that is independent of the current report of the agent and is based only on previous reports. Our characterization extends to multi-agent auctions. We also formulate a discounted infinite horizon version of the problem, where we study the performance of “Markov mechanisms.” ∗This work was supported by ONR grant N00014-12-1-0999, and NSF Awards CCF-0953960 (CAREER), CCF1551875 and SES-1254768. Part of this work was done while the authors were visiting the Simons Institute for Theory of Computing. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://dspace.mit.edu/openaccess-disseminate/1721.1/110836 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
