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Discussion of Should the ECB be restructured , and if so , how ? by
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Berger, Helge |
| Copyright Year | 2003 |
| Abstract | The recent decision of the European Council to admit ten Eastern European countries into the European Union (EU), and by implication into the European Monetary Union (EMU), transforms the issue of reform of decision making institutions at the European Central Bank (ECB) from a pure academic exercise into a practical policy issue. The paper by Berger et. al. presents a welcome systematic evaluation of the tradeoffs that will have to be faced at the ECB in view of enlargement. The basic problem is that under the current institutional structure the Governing Council of the ECB, which is composed of the six members of the Executive Board plus all the Governors of the National Central Banks (NCB) participating in the Euro area (currently eighteen members), may increase up to thirty three. Such a number appears excessive if one is to maintain the ability of the Governing Council to make efficient and timely decisions. Berger et. al., propose a Governing Council of fifteen members. This number appears to strikes a reasonable balance between the need for representation of different countries in the Euro area and the decision making efficacy of the Governing Council. Given this number there is a basic tension between the, politically motivated, principle of equal vote shares to each of the Council members laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, and the need to reflect the fact that countries within the Euro area differ widely in terms of both economic and financial size. Under the current system the principle of equal vote shares leads to |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.tau.ac.il/~alexcuk/pdf/berger-haan-ecb-enl-disc.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Discussion |
