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When Harmonizing Can be Harmful – Managing Divergence and Convergence in Coalition Command Work
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Persson, Per-Arne |
| Abstract | The theme of the symposium is “Working together”, the framework being coalition command. Some of its topics are interoperability, harmonizing technology differences, and the management of multicultural complexities. This paper will discuss the work that is conducted during command and control, command work , and what “together” implies and presupposes, eventually the design of IT artefacts. It summarizes an empirical qualitative study on command that has been partially reported during two previous symposiums (1995 and 1996). The study has developed command theory and led to suggestions concerning the design of information systems, how these systems and work constitute a whole. This entity must not be artificially separated by instrumental methods for systems development and change that neglect social aspects of the work, reducing the necessary freedom of action for coalition warriors and partners. Work is an important study topic because it shall create a common culture, integrate different units, opinions, and shifting opinions. The title of the paper captures what is at stake in command work and especially in coalitions: blunt harmonizing can lead to divergence instead of convergence because social aspects are neglected. On the other hand, convergence can eventually end in reduced variety and failure to handle complex environments. 1. Command Assumptions, Theory and Concepts 1.1 The Analytic Framework "..the theory must effectively integrate basic and applied research, as well as science and social science, if it is to converge on the true essence of command and control. This will require the rigor that attends quantification yet the human understanding that can be derived only from qualitative methods. " [Foster, 1988, p. 224] There has been an ongoing search for command theory during several years [ibid.; Levis and Levis, 1994], means for better understanding command work and cooperation and how to design supporting technologies, especially in the form of computer-based information systems. Within Information Systems Research (ISR) domains such as Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW), Organizational Memory (OM) and Collaborative Systems exemplify ongoing work with relations to military command work. Distributed decisionmaking [Sage, 1987] and Distrib1 The National Defence College has supported the whole study. The fieldwork was conducted within the 13. Army division HQ where staff in every possible way demonstrated an open mind and generosity towards the military researcher who tried to catch more than a glimpse of what went on. uted Cognition are other related directions. My study, initiated in 1995 [see Persson, 1995; 1996] ended in an empirical ethnographic study conducted as fieldwork within tactical army command organizations, which has led to a theory of c mmand work , with considerable explanatory and descriptive capacity. The paper will discuss what command work is, where theory comes from, and presents a model of this kind of work together with conclusions for the design of supporting technologies. Thereby the paper summarizes the final phase of my study. Ultimately, we need consistency between theory and practice, not that either part is out of phase with the other. In order to reach satisfactory theories and support solutions within Information Systems Design (ISD) it is necessary to form an idea of what the theme for the symposium, “working together” means, both what “work” is (should be) and what “together” implies. This is central, especially within a coalition. There, commitment and trust perhaps have to be achieved rapidly and compensate for the absence of a direct unity of command as for example during the Gulf War (1990– 91) and the succession of operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Convergence within an organization—the necessary condition for the establishment of an organization—might easily turn into divergence if something goes wrong, when the communication within a unit is interrupted. Each state is a common social phenomenon. The theoretical concept dialectic of (management) control [Nandan, 1997] explains these tendencies. It conceptualizes the ability of subordinates to affect power holders, and is an expression of the relations between autonomy and dependence which are in-built into the organisational hierarchy, operating at every level, framing both double-sided beneficial power relationships and subordinates’ escapes from close supervision. According to this perspective, close managerial supervision is not only impossible, it also further promotes the dialectic of control. The word “harmonizing” is closely related to power. It says that an end-state may be a technically harmonized (standardized) infrastructure, but one imposed during conflicts and during resistance and therefore being less stable. What looks like a satisfactory outcome may instead be a state of “colonization of mind” [Mignolo, 1995] when a foreign technology or culture has been superimposed replacing another one, equally valuable mindset. There are parallels when systems development introduces a foreign element in an organization: new concepts, technologies and processes, a new world view. Convergence and divergence are not only about reduced or augmented complexity. The wellbeing and survival of any organization ultimately rests on its ability to demonstrate sufficient variety to handle its environment yet maintain a coherent shape. Enforced convergence (specialization, one-sidedness) and detailed control may reduce this capacity and unfavourably shift the convergence-divergence balance. Few environments are totally stable, offering no surprises and allowing tight detailed central control. Total convergence may be counterproductive: the unit becomes too specialized to be able to act outside a narrow sector of the environment. 1.2 Theoretical Requirements on Command and Control Unfortunately most efforts to theorize about command and control (C2) do not see power and domination as problematic issues, yet the practice of command shows numerous examples of how the dialectic actually has a considerable influence. Consequently idealistic models of command risk to be obsolete and miss essential issues of the social reality involved. We pride ourselves on our rationality, while avoiding reality. If we are to function effectively as diplomats and soldiers, we need to turn a dispassionate eye on mankind. We need to study the behavior of the individual and the mass, and to do it without stricture. We cherish the fiction that technology will be the answer to all of our dilemmas, but our enemies know that flesh and blood form the irresistible answer to our technologies. [Peters, 1999b, p. 35] Builder et al. [1999] stated that a deeper theory of C2 is required, complaining that contemporary C2 theories are about organizations and communications, often taking the form of charts and diagrams. Commanders become the occupiers of boxes through which messages flow. Such theories do not explain what C2 does and does not do, can and cannot do. They do not explain the qualities of the ideas or how these ideas are expressed within the system. Builder et al. searched a theory about C2 concerned not only with the organizational and technical aspects of information processing, but also the quality of ideas, how they are expressed and how the qualities of people contribute to or detract from C2, not only how activities should be organized and ‘wired’ together. The new theory should encompass both high-level creative and the direct-order and control aspects. They stated that theory should be prescriptive and explanatory. The basic requirements are that the C2 system shall transmit the command concept formulated by the commander and his vision of the prospective operation that informs the making of command decisions during the subsequent operation. Unfortunately these researchers claimed the cognitive processes of the commander being the essence of command [p. xiii]. We must leave the invisible, centralized and mystical world and instead turn to what is visible, where work is. Likewise, it is necessary to avoid blunt beliefs in more technology as remedy, or that technology differences are the only worth engaging in. The concept of “technological frames” [Orlikowski and Gash, 1994] is another way to express how technology is interpreted and valued differently within an organization. We must therefore ask ourselves on what foundation theory and practice are built, on ideal but incomplete assumptions or on other grounds, and how conclusions about good/bad technology and practices are reached. Narrow definitions are for the frightened and the mediocre. And the best definitions are intuitive. Language serves only to communicate a shadow of the ideal; words reduce and constrain. At most, definitions of concepts should be regarded as intellectual shorthand. Like doctrine, such definitions should offer starting points they must not be used as shackles. [Peters, 1999a, p. 167] An example of a taken for granted but hardly justified belief is what Scaife and Rogers [1996] called the “resemblance fallacy” meaning the strong common sense positive notion of resembling representations when the real world is modelled. There is some evidence that the connection between the object world and how it is represented is far more complex than resemblance. Instead what is important to study is how people interact with graphical representations, and the relations between internal (mental, cognitive) and external representations 2. What is command work? Van Creveld [1985] stated that what is management in business, is better labelled command when studying the military, and a way to avoid more cryptic terms, abbreviations etc. The term I use, command work, is the military analogy to what is called managerial work elsewhere [discussed by Lind and Arvidsson, eds., 1998]. Command work is characterized by or contains the following: the interplay of both formal, infor |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2000/5th_ICCRTS/cd/papers/Track3/054.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
