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Incentive Stackelberg Strategies for a Dynamic Game on Terrorism
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Behrens, Doris A. Caulkins, Jonathan P. Feichtinger, Gustav Tragler, Gernot |
| Copyright Year | 2007 |
| Abstract | This paper presents a dynamic game model of international terrorism. The time horizon is finite, about the size of one presidency, or infinite. Quantitative and qualitative analyses of incentive Stackelberg strategies for both decisionmakers of the game (“theWest” and “International Terror Organization”) allow statements about the possibilities and limitations of terror control interventions. Recurrent behavior is excluded with monotonic variation in the frequency of terror attacks whose direction depends on when the terror organization launches its terror war. Even optimal pacing of terror control operations does not greatly alter the equilibrium of the infinite horizon game, but outcomes from theWest’s perspective can be greatly improved if the game is only “played” for brief periods of time and if certain parameters can be influenced, notably those pertaining to the terror organization’s ability to recruit replacements. |
| Starting Page | 459 |
| Ending Page | 486 |
| Page Count | 28 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1007/978-0-8176-4553-3_23 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/research/294full.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=heinzworks |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-4553-3_23 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
