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Quick and Dirty Patents
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Hegde, Deepak Ljungqvist, Alexander P. Raj, M. S. B. Phridvi |
| Copyright Year | 2020 |
| Abstract | The scope and timing of patents determine the size of economic rewards to inventors. We provide causal evidence on the effects of scope and timing on startups and externalities on their rivals, by leveraging the quasi-random assignment of patent applications to examiners. Using unique data on all first-time applications filed at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office since 2001, we find that patent grant delays are harmful to the inventor, in terms of reduced growth in employment and sales and a reduced quantity and quality of follow-on innovation. In addition, delays are harmful to both the inventor and its rivals in terms of access to external capital. Broader scope, on the other hand, tends to benefit the inventor (in terms of follow-on innovation) while harming rivals (in terms of growth and follow-on innovation). Our findings suggest that “quick” patents maximize both inventor rewards and positive externalities to rivals. “Dirty” patents may benefit inventors but also impose large negative externalities on rivals. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.3511268 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://mgmt.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Quick-And-Dirty-Patents.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3511268 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
