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CMSC 858 F : Algorithmic Game Theory Fall 2010 Frugality & Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design Instructor :
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Hajiaghayi, Mohammad Taghi |
| Copyright Year | 2010 |
| Abstract | Recall from the previous lecture that in combinatorial auction each bidder has an associated real-valued valuation function V defined for each subset of items S. An allocation of items S1, S2, . . . , Sn among the bidders with valuation function V1, V2, . . . , Vn respectively is socially efficient if the allocation maximizes the social welfare ∑ i Vi(Si). Combinatorial auction is a very general auction setting and it is well-known that if we use VCG payments, then this is incentive-compatible. However there are some issues. The two major issues in combinatorial auctions are, |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.cs.umd.edu/~hajiagha/AGT10/scribe-29-09-2010.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
