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Unraveling of Information : Competition and Uncertainty
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Stivers, Andrew |
| Copyright Year | 2004 |
| Abstract | This paper examines incentives for information disclosure in a oligopolistic market when buyers are unsure of the existence of that information. Previous empirical and theoretical work has shown that mandatory disclosure laws can be binding when buyers do not know whether the information exists. This paper shows that the information unraveling result is strengthened by competition not only because a market with more firms is increasingly likely to have at least one firm with quality high enough to want to disclose it (thus starting the information unraveling result) but also because firms reveal information that makes themselves look bad if they can make their competitors look worse. This results in prisoner’s dilemma style incentives to reveal that ensures full disclosure as the number of firms goes to infinity. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1151&context=bejte |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Accidental Falls Appendix Convex set Existential quantification Fixed point (mathematics) Fixed-Point Number Full disclosure (computer security) Infinity Mandatory - HL7DefinedRoseProperty Mandatory access control Prisoner's dilemma Scientific Publication |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
