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Macroprudential Regulation Versus Mopping Up After the Crash
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Jeanne, Olivier Johns |
| Copyright Year | 2012 |
| Abstract | We study the interplay of optimal ex-ante (macroprudential) and ex-post (monetary or fiscal stimulus) measures to respond to systemic financial crises in a tractable model of fire sales. We find that it is generally optimal to use both, rejecting the Greenspan doctrine to only intervene ex post. Optimal macroprudential policy resolves the time consistency problems associated with stimulus measures. However, if macroprudential policy is suboptimal, for example because of circumvention, only monetary stimulus should be used, and it is desirable to commit to smaller stimulus. Furthermore, accumulating macroprudential tax revenue in a bailout fund used for stimulus measures is undesirable. JEL Codes: E44, G18, H23 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/pdf/conferences/mar_net/Jeanne_Korinek_2012-10.pdf?39fb47ebb2d6b3188c2e2a2180643891 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.econ2.jhu.edu/People/Jeanne/JeanneKorinek.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.ecb.eu/events/pdf/conferences/mar_net/Jeanne_Korinek_2012-10.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/pdf/conferences/mar_net/Jeanne_Korinek_2012-10.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2014/retrieve.php?pdfid=486 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Cobham's thesis Code Money Time consistency |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |