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Do Roses Speak Louder than Words ? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Lee, Soohyung |
| Copyright Year | 2009 |
| Abstract | Many markets suffer from frictions and a potential lack of information about each other’s preferences. The emerging field of market design tries to understand when markets work well, and when they do not, and how to fix them in case they’re broken. Such exploits range from organizing centralized clearinghouses to ease problems of congestion, to organizing decentralized markets by affecting rules and norms about offers and acceptances, to providing platforms to exchange information. A more recent approach is to allow participants to provide signals that are cheap (in that they are not binding), but costly – in that they are limited in numbers. One example of signaling in matching markets is the U.S. market for college admission: In the US, there are two rounds of college admission, one is early (where applications are sent around October), and one is late (with applications sent at the end of December). The early rounds of applications have seen numerous changes in the past years, where a prominent feature is single-choice early action. A student can differentiate herself by selecting early action from other students who choose not to. In theory, this action can provide additional information on |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=NAWM2010&paper_id=411 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
