Reflexive monism versus complementarism: An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans’s reflexive model of consciousness

Content Provider	Semantic Scholar
Author	Hoche, Hans-Ulrich
Copyright Year	2007
Abstract	From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic ‘phenomenon’ in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans’s reflexive model with a complementaristic approach in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans’s ontological monism and his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical causation.
Starting Page	389
Ending Page	409
Page Count	21
File Format	PDF HTM / HTML
DOI	10.1007/s11097-006-9045-8
Alternate Webpage(s)	http://cogprints.org/4748/1/Microsoft_Word_-_PHEN_324Hoche.final.corr.pdf
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-006-9045-8
Volume Number	6
Language	English
Access Restriction	Open
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article