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Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players Summary
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Cartwright, Edward J. Wooders, Myrna Holtz |
| Copyright Year | 2003 |
| Abstract | Intepret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterized how large " must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly rational, that is, where " can be chosen to be small. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/118150/1/NDL2003-123.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1500/1/WRAP_Cartwright_twerp687.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/papers/twerp687.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Approximation algorithm Complement System Proteins Conformity Exhibits as Topic Kind of quantity - Equilibrium Nash equilibrium Rationality Societies Web Coverage Service |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
