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A Note on k-price Auctions with Complete Information When Mixed Strategies are Allowed
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Mathews, Timothy |
| Copyright Year | 2018 |
| Abstract | Restricting attention to players who use pure strategies, Tauman (2001) proves that in a k-price auction (k 3) for every Nash equilibrium in which no player uses a weakly dominated strategy: (i) the bidder with the highest value wins the auction and (ii) pays a price higher than the second-highest value among the players, thereby generating more revenue for the seller than would occur in a rstor second-price auction. We show that these results do not necessarily hold when mixed strategies are allowed. In particular, we construct an equilibrium for k 4 in which the second-highest valued player wins the auction and makes an expected payment strictly less than her value. This equilibriumwhich exists for any generic draw of player valuationsinvolves only one player using a nondegenerate mixed strategy, for which the amount of mixing can be made arbitrarily small. JEL Classi cation Numbers: C72 (noncooperative games), D44 (auctions) |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5247&context=facpubs |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Cations Kind of quantity - Equilibrium Nash equilibrium |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
