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COOPERATION IN n-PLAYER REPEATED GAMES
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Copyright Year | 2013 |
| Abstract | After introducing the basics of a recent decomposition of singleshot games (Jessie and Saari [3]) into their strategic and behavioral parts, it is shown how this decomposition provides new results and insights into the nature of repeated interactions. For any two-strategy n ≥ 2 player game, it is shown how to obtain a complete characterization of when a specified outcome is sustainable in an infinitely repeated setting, given a standard choice of punishment. This characterization is given by a simple relationship between strategic and non-strategic components. Furthermore, it is shown how this analysis can extend issues raised by simplified 2-player scenarios to a n ≥ 3 player setting; specifically, results obtained for a 2-player analysis need not hold for the n-player case even under generous assumptions. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.imbs.uci.edu/files/docs/technical/2013/mbs_04-13.pdf |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Class Interaction Video Games |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
