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First-price auctions with resale : the case of many bidders
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Virág, Gábor |
| Copyright Year | 2009 |
| Abstract | If agents engage in resale, it changes bidding in the initial auction. Resale o¤ers extra incentives for bidders with lower valuations to win the auction. However, if resale markets are not frictionless, then use values a¤ect bidding incentives, and stronger bidders still win the initial auction more often than weaker ones. I consider a rst price auction followed by a resale market with frictions, and con rm the above statements. While intuitive, our results di¤er from the two bidder case of Hafalir and Krishna (2008): the two bidders win with equal probabilities regardless of their use values. The reason is that they face a common (resale) price at the relevant margin, a property that fails with more than two bidders. Numerical simulations show that asymmetry in winning probabilities increases in the number of bidders, and in large markets resale loses its e¤ect on allocations. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2011/retrieve.php?pdfid=285 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.econ.rochester.edu/Faculty/Virag/resale.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17094/1/MPRA_paper_17094.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2011conference/program/retrieve.php?pdfid=285 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Greater Than Naruto Shippuden: Clash of Ninja Revolution 3 Numerical linear algebra Probability Real-time bidding Simulation |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |