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Majority shareholder protection by variable qualified majority rules
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Casajus, André Labrenz, Helfried Hiller, Tobias |
| Copyright Year | 2009 |
| Abstract | In this paper, we analyze judicial review according to the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, §§ 243 et seqq.) and its blocking effect with the help of concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we suggest variable qualified majority rules as ingredients of arrangements which balance the interests of a majority shareholder and of the minority shareholders. |
| Starting Page | 9 |
| Ending Page | 18 |
| Page Count | 10 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10657-009-9096-8 |
| Volume Number | 28 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://home.uni-leipzig.de/casajus/texts/majprot.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-009-9096-8 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |