Breves considerações sobre o processo inferencial na epistemologia de Charles S. Peirce

Content Provider	Semantic Scholar
Author	Madeira, Marcelo Silvano
Copyright Year	2013
Abstract	Resumo: No que compete a Historia da Logica, podemos divisar dois tipos de logicos, a saber: aqueles que se valem de principios psicologicos para o raciocinio e aqueles que nao se valem de tais principios. Charles S. Peirce pertenceu ao segundo grupo e, sobre o referido assunto, ele possuia determinada posicao da qual nunca mudou de opiniao, embora esta somente tenha se consolidado em sua maturidade quando estatuiu a sua Classificacao das Ciencias. Neste artigo, nao lidaremos com esse Peirce maduro cujas concepcoes filosoficas ja estao consolidadas. Nossa pesquisa abordara as raizes de sua filosofia, principalmente quanto a sua concepcao do processo inferencial. Embora possa parecer um tema caracteristico de Logica, a questao que nos propomos e considerar como a mente humana munida do processo inferencial lida com a aquisicao de conhecimento sem levar em consideracao os aspectos psicologicos. Assim, partindo-se do pressuposto do aspecto nao psicologico atribuido a logica, procuraremos estabelecer os principios que fundamentam a existencia de um substrato de mesma natureza entre o conhecedor e o conhecido, de maneira que o produto adquirido, isto e, o conhecimento estabelecido na forma de um pensamento nao se reduza a uma criacao mental humana. Palavras-chave: Epistemologia; Inferencias Logicas; Representacao; Semiotica. Abstract: Where it is pertinent to the History of Logic, we could discern two types of logicians, namely: those that accept psychological principles to the reasoning and those that not accept such principles. Charles S. Peirce belonged to the second group and, about such matter, he had a certain position which he never changed his opinion, although this have only be consolidated in his maturity when he conceived his Classification of Sciences. In this article, we will not deal with such mature Peirce whose philosophical concepts are already consolidated. Our research will approach the roots of his philosophy mainly as to his concept of inferential process. Although it could seem a characteristic theme of logic, the question that we are proposing is to consider as the human mind equipped with this inferential process deals with the acquisition of knowledge without take psychological aspects into consideration. Thus, starting from the assumption of the unpsychological aspect attributed to the logic, we will intend to establish the principles that ground the existence of a substrate of the same nature between the cognizant and the cognizable, in a such way the acquired product, that is, the knowledge established in the form of a thought not be reduced to a human mental creation.
Starting Page	83
Ending Page	92
Page Count	10
File Format	PDF HTM / HTML
Volume Number	6
Alternate Webpage(s)	http://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/ojs/index.php/intuitio/article/download/14409/10441
Language	English
Access Restriction	Open
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article